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Abstract
Inflation magnifies the distorting effects of taxation when thetax treatment ofinterest income
and expense is not fully indexed to inflation. The distortion involves a real interest tax wedge
which is the difference betweenthe realbefore tax interest rate that influences fully taxed
investors and the real after tax interest ratethat influences savers. Reducing the real tax wedge
by eliminating inflation or indexing would stimulate private saving and non-residential
investment, but decrease tax receipts and the tax deductions that subsidize homeownership.
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Inflation, Real Interest Tax Wedges, and Capital Formation
William G. Dewald
This paper focuses on how inflation interacts with taxes and interest rates to affect
capital formation.1 It uses a simple credit-market framework to explain how inflation
magnifies the distorting effectsof taxation when the tax treatment ofinterest income and
expense is not fully indexed to inflation.2 The distortion involves a real tax wedge consisting
of the differencebetween the real interest rate fully taxed investors must pay when they
borrow to invest and the real after-tax interest rate that savers earn. This asymmetry in the
way that fully taxed investors and savers areaffected by income taxes leads to an increase in
inflation increasing the real tax wedge in credit markets,
Either eliminating inflationor indexing thetax treatment ofinterest income and
deductible interest expense to inflation would reduce this real tax wedge and consequently
increase private saving and business capital formation. Eliminating inflation or its induced tax
effects on interest rates would decrease nominal rates for two reasons: Absent inflation,
interest rates would not contain an inflation premium; hence, nominal interest rates would be
lower. Furthermore, if there were no inflation, or if the tax treatment ofinterest income and
deductibleinterest expense were indexed, nominal interest rates would fallbecause saving asa
functionofthe interest rate would tend to increase. With the higher after-tax returns that
1would result from removing the tax on the inflation premium in nominal interest rates, savers
would save more. An increased supply of saving would in turn lower before-tax real interest
rates and thereby stimulate the business investment.
Not everyone would benefit from eliminating theinflation-induced tax distortion in
credit markets, however. Although eliminating inflation or indexing the taxes on interest
income and expense would raiseprivate saving and nonresidential investment, governments
and homeowners would face higher realborrowing costs and real interest outlays. This would
happen because after-tax real interest rates are not only theeffective real rates that savers earn;
they are also the effectivereal rates at which the government and homeowners borrow. Fully
taxed borrowersborrow at a before-tax real interest rate, but the government borrows at an
after-tax real rate because its interest payments to the public add to theincome on which it
collects taxes. Homeowners also borrow at an after-tax real rate. Theyare not taxed on the
real benefits from living in their homes, which are effectively income, and in theUnited
States, unlike some other countries, their related interest costs can generally be deducted from
taxable income.
In summary, either eliminating inflation or indexing thetax treatment ofinterest
income and expense to inflation would stimulate private saving and, in turn, business
investment, but itwould decrease tax receipts on interest income and thetax deductions that
subsidize home ownership.
INFLATION AND THE TAX WEDGE
Stiglitz (1973) and Auerbach (1983), among others, have shown that theinvestment
decisions of fully taxed investors aremotivated by before-tax, not after-tax, real interest rates.
2It is intuitively reasonable to specify that investmentdecisions dependon real returns and real
interest rates, and thus are not influenced by inflation. Investors presumably cut throughthe
veil ofinflation to makedecisions based on realfundamentals. However, it is counterintuitive
to specify that investment decisions depend on before-tax, not after-tax, real interest rates.
After all, taxes are certainly an important cost factor for businesses. Nevertheless, there is a
good argument for why borrower-financed investment would not be directly affected by a
uniform tax rate that applied to both investment income and the deductions for interest
expense. Suppose the cost ofan investment is c, the expected return in one period is 1 +g,
and the interest cost in one period is 1+1. The investor would continue to invest as long as net
profit a was not negative: a = (1+g) - c(1 +1). The investment decision would not be
affected by changes in the income tax rate, r, since the appropriate choice to maximize (l-r)a
would also maximize a. Hence, for fully taxed investors facing thesame tax rate on their
earnings and their deductible costs, the before-tax interest rate, i, influences investment
decisions, not the after-tax interest rate, i(l-r).
The argument is that investors would rank alternative investments on thebasis of the
expected profitability ofeach investment, net of interest and other costs. A changein the tax
rate would change the expectedprofitability associated with alternative investments, but it
would not change the ranking oftheir expected profitability. The investment that was ranked
as the most profitable when the tax rate was 50 percent would still be the most profitablewhen
the tax rate was reduced to 40 percent. Onthe basis ofthis argument, investment decisions
are specified to depend on before-tax interest rates, which would affect the ranking of
investment alternatives with respect to expected profitability.
3To restatethis critical argument: Prospective investors who finance theirinvestments
by borrowing would make the same rankings ofthe expected profitability ofparticular
investment alternatives regardless ofthe leveloftax rates. Profits, ofcourse, would differ
with different tax rates, but as long as the same tax rate were applicable to both investment
returns and deductible interest expenses, the level oftax rates wouldnot influence the rank
order oftheprofitability ofinvestment alternatives.3 An implication isthat prospective before-
tax real ratesofreturn on investments and prospectivebefore-tax real rates ofinterest at which
such returns are discounted would affect investment decisions, not after-tax rates ofreturn or
after-tax rates ofinterest. Thus, tax rates would not influence investment choices directly.
Tax rates, however, would influence investment choices indirectlybecause tax rates
would affect saving and, indirectly, the market-clearing real interest rates at which investment
isfinanced. Increasing inflation and/or tax rates would lower the after-tax interest rate that
savers earn and thus decrease saving, thereby raising before-tax real interest rates and reducing
investment. These points are clarified by reference to the following figures. A numerical
example appears on p. 13.
In Figure 1, real investment by fully taxed borrowers varies inversely with a before-tax
real interest rate: r8=i-2r, where i is the nominalinterest rate and ~ris the inflation rate. Real
saving, S, in contrast to real investment, is specified to vary directlywith an after-tax real
interest rate: r~ = i(1-i) - ir. When both the tax rate, r, and the inflation rate, r, are zero, the
real rate for borrowers, ,f~, equals the real rate for lenders, ,~. The upward-sloping saving
function intersects with the downward-sloping investment function at pointA to determine the
equilibrium market interest rate, r’~and saving (= investment), S0.
4As noted, enactment ofa tax on interest income leaves the investment function
unaffected. But, asdepicted in Figure 2, the upward-sloping saving function depends on the
after-tax real interest rate. The saving function rotates up and to the left with an increase in
the tax rate from zero to r,. As a result, the credit-market equilibrium would shift from A to
B, the equilibrium real rate for borrowers wouldincrease from ,~Bto
1~
,B the equilibrium real
rate for savers would decrease from r to i~, and theequilibrium level ofsaving would
decrease from S~ to S1. The difference between ~Band rt represents a real tax wedge,
essentiallyreflecting that the difference between the borrowing rate and lending rate on such
credit-market transactions is transferred to the government in taxes.
Figure 3 illustrates what happens when there is both inflation and income taxation. As
noted above, rankings ofalternative investments are independent ofboth the tax rate and
inflation. Consequently, real investment, as a function ofthe nominal interest rate, shifts up
by exactly the increase in the inflation rate, ~‘r1. In contrast, when savers are taxed on their
interest income, the saving function must rise by more than the increase in the inflation rate.
As shown in Figure 3, to get the same saving when inflation increases to ~r1 with tax rate, r1,
the nominal interest rate wouldhave to increase by ir1 /(l-r1). That is an amount such that
(1-r1) ofit is equal to the increase in inflation. Thus, an increase in inflation shifts the saving
function up by ir1/(l-r1), which, given that the tax rate is positive but less than one, is greater
than the upward shift in the investment function, which shifts up by 2V1 Consequently, an
inflation increase from zero to ir1 would move the credit-market equilibrium from B to C in
real terms. The nominal interest rate is determined by the equilibrium point, D, which is at the
5intersection ofreal saving and real investment specified as functions ofthe nominal interest
rate. The result isa higher market-clearing nominal interest rate, i2, and a higher before-tax
real interest rate, r, but a lower after-tax real interest rate, r,’~,and lower level ofsaving, S2.
Expressed another way, an increase in inflation from zero to ~r1 wouldincrease the real tax
wedge.
The effect ofinflation on real interest rates isreally thecrux ofthe credit-market
distortion associated with the interaction ofinflation, taxes, and interest rates. The distortion
causes a change in the allocation ofresources from what it would be in an inflation-free
environment.
It can be shown that ifinterest income and expense are not indexed to inflation in the
tax structure, the real tax wedge equals the tax rate times the nominal interest rate.
Note that





• with inflation ir1, the real tax wedge is r2~~ (~2 — ,r)—[i(l— ~ )—.ir]— i1
Thus, when inflation increases from zero to ir1 the real tax wedge increasesby
r1(12 — r/~ )= r1[(, + — rj~ 1. The inflation-induced increase in the real tax wedge
incorporates three elements: thetax rate, r~, the increase in theinflation rate, n~, and the
inflation-induced increase in the before-tax real interest rate, r,~ _
1~~
B~
The incidence ofinflation-induced tax increases would depend on the investment and
saving function elasticities. If saving were perfectly inelastic with respect to interest rates, the
6full incidence would fall on saving. Ifinvestment were perfectly inelastic with respectto
interest rates, the full incidence would fall on investment. Since empirical studies tend to
confirm that saving is comparatively inelastic, it is reasonable to conclude that much ofthe
impact ofan increase in inflation on taxes would fall on savers, although any induced
reduction in saving would be reflected in reduced capital formation.
To reiterate the argument in Figure 3, increased inflation would effectively raisethe tax
on savers’ interest income and lower their real after-tax interest earnings. In response, they
would plan to save and lend less, which would raise the real interest rate on borrowing to
finance investment. Either an increase in inflation or an increase in tax rates would increase
the real tax wedge; that is, it would increase the before-tax real rate that influences investors
but decrease theafter-tax real rate that influences savers. Since an inflation increase would
shift the saving function back and thereby induce a decrease in investment, it has thesame
qualitativeeffect in reducing capital formation as an increase in tax rates.
INDEXING THE TAX TREATMENT OFINTEREST INCOME
Figure 4 shows that the benefits ofeliminating inflation on capital formation can be
obtained by indexing the tax treatment ofinterest income and expense to inflation. Saving is
now specified to depend on an after-tax real interest rate where the tax is based on a before-tax
real interest rate — not, as previously, on a before-tax nominal interest rate. Consequently,
both the investmentfunction and the saving function are now specified to be independent of
theinflation rate. Both functions shift up by exactly the increase in inflation. Under indexing,
for any inflation rate, there would be a lower-equilibrium nominal interest rate and a lower
before-tax real rate but a higher after-tax real rate for savers. The real tax wedge would not be
7eliminated, but it would be made independent ofinflation. The equilibrium nominal before-
tax interest rate would be i3, the before-tax real rate would be ,~, the real after-tax rate would
be ,~ = r/3 (1— ri), and the real tax wedge would be ~r7 Other than the nominal interest
rate, which would fully reflect inflation, the realbefore-tax and after-tax interest rates and real
saving and investment would be precisely the same under indexing as if inflation were
eliminated.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The roughly 3 percent inflationrate over recent years is low compared with inflation in
the late l970s and early 1980s. But 3 percent is not zero. As the numerical example in the
appendix shows, even 3 percent inflation could be linked to a substantial real tax wedge.
Eliminating inflation remains a putativegoal of monetary policy. Ifinflation is not
eradicated completely, it is reasonable to consider designing tax policies to avoid real
distortions in the allocation ofresources that result from theinteraction ofinflation, interest
rates, and taxes. Indexing income tax rates to inflation, but not the tax treatment ofnominal
interest income and expense, leaves the interest-sensitive capital-formation process subject to
potentially significant distortions. Although inflation-indexed Treasury bonds were introduced
in 1997 to index nominal interest returns to inflation, these nominal returns continue to be
taxed as ordinaryincome. Therefore, simply indexing interest rates to inflation does not index
thetax treatment ofinterest income and expenseto inflation and thus does not fully protect the
creditmarket from distortions that accompany increases in inflation.
8Effectively indexing the tax treatment ofinterest income and expense would prevent
inflation from arbitrarily raising tax rates on saving andreducing corporate investment as it did
in the 1970s and early l980s.~For whatever technical or political reasons, indexing thetax
treatment ofinterest income and expense is difficult to implement. Consequently, price-level
stabilitybecomes all the moreimportant amonetary policy objective, the achievement of
which would reduce distortions in creditmarkets that retard saving, investment, and capital
formation.
A FEDERALBUDGET DEFICIT COROLLARY
The corollary is that real taxes would tend to fall and real federal budget deficits would
tend to rise when inflation declines or interest income andexpense are indexed to inflation.
By contrast, a conventional view is that indexing the taxes on interest income and expense to
inflation would lower nominal interest rates and thus decrease thegovernment deficit.5 The
argument isthat, “. . . even if the fall in the nominal rate [because ofindexing] was only
1 percentage point (a figure that can be considered conservative), it would still have important
effects. It would, for example, by reducing interest costs in thepublic debt, reduce theU.S.
fiscal deficit by $8 billion “~ Such an argument is questionable. It does not take into
account that the government borrows at an effective after-tax real interest rate because it
collects taxeson the interest it pays to taxpayers.
The present argument has shown that indexing the taxes on interest income and expense
or reducing inflation would increase, not decrease, after-tax real interest rates and thus
increasethe effective real interest rates at which the government borrows. In its simplest
terms, theargument is that indexing interest taxation to inflation would eliminate one source of
9federal revenue — the tax on the inflation premium in nominal interest rates. Consequently,
indexing interest taxation or eliminating inflation would increase, not decrease, the real federal
budget deficit. The fallacyin the argument that indexing interest taxation to inflation would
decrease the deficit is in not taking into account that indexing would tend to raise the effective
real interest rate on government borrowing and hence raise the real budget deficit.
CONCLUSION
Either lowering inflation or indexing the taxation ofinterest income and expensewould
reduce real taxes and stimulate saving and nonresidential investment by eliminating a major
distortion that influences capital formation and potential growth. Absent an effectiveprogram
to index interest income and expenseto inflation, keeping inflation low and, in principle,
eliminating it represents an effective way to minimize the real tax wedge between thereal rates
that influence investors and savers, thereby stimulating capital formation. The bottom line is
that pricestabilization policies arepro-growth policies.
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12APPENDIX: A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A numerical example further illustrates the argument. The example is based on a
simple linear credit market-model with taxes and inflation. Units ofsaving and investment are
in billions of dollars.
Numerical Example
Saving (no indexing): S = -lO+1000[i(1-r)-r].
Saving (indexing): S = -10+ 1000[(i-2r)(1-r)].
Investment: I = 90 -1000[i-~r].
Equilibrium: S = I.
In theno-indexing case, saving is a function of an after-tax interest rate,
rL = i (l-r) -pr. Taxes paid by savers depend on the nominal interest rate, i. Ifby assumption
thetax rate is 40 percent and the inflationrate is 3 percent, the nominal interest rate is
10 percent. Savers earn a6percent after-tax nominal interest rate, i.e. [10 percent x (1 -
0.4)]. Their after-tax real rate of return is 3 percent, i.e. [10 percent x (1 - 0.4) - 3 percent].
The before-tax real interest rate influencing investors is 7 percent, i.e. (10percent - 3
percent). The difference between before-tax and after-taxreal interest rates is4 percent,
which isthe
40 percent tax on the 10 percent nominal interest rate. This 4 percentagepoint difference is
the real tax wedge. It would be associated with real saving and investment of $20 billion.
Ifinflation were eliminated altogether, therewould still be a real tax wedge, but it
would be reduced by the magnitude of the tax on the decrease in the interest rate on which
13savers are taxed. Compared with the 3 percent inflation case, eliminating inflation would
reducethe real before-tax interest rates from 7 percent to 6.25 percent but raise the real after-
tax interest rate from 3 percent to 3.75 percent, thus decreasing the real tax wedge from
4 percent to 2.5 percent, thereby inducing an increase in saving from $20 billion to $27½
billion.
Fully indexing the tax treatment ofinterest income for savers would make saving a
function ofan after-tax rate that is independent ofinflation: r~ = (i-~r)(1-r). Taxes paid by
saversdepend on the real interest rate, (i-ir), and not the nominal interest rate, i. Evenwith
3 percent inflation, but with theintroduction of indexing, the nominal interest rate would fall
from 10 percent to 9.25 percent, the real before-tax interest rate would fall from 7 percent to
6.25 percent, the real after-tax interest rate would rise from 3 percent to 3.75 percent, the real
tax wedge would fall from 4 percent to 2.25 percent, and saving (=investment) would rise
from $20 billion to $27.5 billion. These areprecisely the same real magnitudes that would
result from eliminating inflation.
Iftaxes were also eliminated, the real interest rate that clears the credit market in this
example would be 5 percent, the realtax wedgewould be zero, and saving (= investment)
would be an undistorted $40 billion.
14ENDNOTES
The theoretical basis for the present article is derived from Dewald (1986).
2 There have been many detailed studies of taxesthat have taken interactions with
inflation into account. See, for example, Feldstein and Summers (1979), Fullerton and
Karayannis (1993), and King and Fullerton (1984).
~I nthe U.S. economy, applicable taxrates differ. Fazzari andHerzon (1996) identify
how different tax rates may affect investment decisions.
‘~Fazzari and Herzon (1996) show how indexing capital gains taxation for inflation
would increase incentives to invest, but they may notrecognize that even ifcapital gains are
indexed for inflation, the taxation of nominal interest income would lower real rates to savers
butraise real rates to borrowers thusraising the cost ofcapital, thereby decreasing incentives
to invest.
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